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Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game
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SYSNO ASEP 0348753 Druh ASEP J - Článek v odborném periodiku Zařazení RIV J - Článek v odborném periodiku Poddruh J Článek ve WOS Název Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game Tvůrce(i) Engelmann, Dirk (NHU-N) RID
Normann, H.-T. (GB)Zdroj.dok. Experimental Economics - ISSN 1386-4157
Roč. 13, č. 3 (2010), s. 249-259Poč.str. 11 s. Jazyk dok. eng - angličtina Země vyd. NL - Nizozemsko Klíč. slova minimum-effort game ; coordination game ; experiments ; social capital Vědní obor RIV AH - Ekonomie CEZ AV0Z70850503 - NHU-N (2005-2011) UT WOS 000280555100001 DOI 10.1007/s10683-010-9239-3 Anotace We report results from standard minimum-effort experiments conducted in Copenhagen (Denmark). Our subjects frequently coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium even in groups of six. This is in stark contrast to the previous literature, as we show in a detailed analysis of experiments which had the same design but were held in different countries. The subject-pool effect is substantiated by the finding that, the higher the share of Danish subjects in a group, the higher the minimum-effort levels. These findings suggest that the prevalent coordination failures previously observed are affected by significant subject-pool effects. Pracoviště Národohospodářský ústav Kontakt Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Rok sběru 2011
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