Počet záznamů: 1  

Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game

  1. 1. 0348753 - NHU-N 2011 RIV NL eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
    Engelmann, Dirk - Normann, H.-T.
    Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game.
    Experimental Economics. Roč. 13, č. 3 (2010), s. 249-259. ISSN 1386-4157
    Výzkumný záměr: CEZ:AV0Z70850503
    Klíčová slova: minimum-effort game * coordination game * experiments * social capital
    Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
    Impakt faktor: 1.868, rok: 2010

    We report results from standard minimum-effort experiments conducted in Copenhagen (Denmark). Our subjects frequently coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium even in groups of six. This is in stark contrast to the previous literature, as we show in a detailed analysis of experiments which had the same design but were held in different countries. The subject-pool effect is substantiated by the finding that, the higher the share of Danish subjects in a group, the higher the minimum-effort levels. These findings suggest that the prevalent coordination failures previously observed are affected by significant subject-pool effects.
    Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0189190