Počet záznamů: 1  

Hiding information in open auctions with jump bids

  1. 1.
    0461905 - NHU-N 2017 RIV GB eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
    Ettinger, D. - Michelucci, Fabio
    Hiding information in open auctions with jump bids.
    Economic Journal. Roč. 126, č. 594 (2016), s. 1484-1502. ISSN 0013-0133
    Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985998
    Klíčová slova: hiding information * open auctions * jump bids
    Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
    Impakt faktor: 2.608, rok: 2016

    We analyse a rationale for hiding information in open ascending auction formats. We focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information by observing the exact dropout values of the opponents who exit the auction. We show that the decision whether to allow jump bids or not can have a drastic impact on revenue and efficiency.
    Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0261461