Theoretical models of decision-making in the Ultimatum Game: Fairness vs. Reason

0453669 - ÚTIA 2016 RIV SG eng C - Konferenční příspěvek (zahraniční konf.)
Guy, Tatiana Valentine - Kárný, Miroslav - Villa, A. P. - Lintas, A.
Theoretical models of decision-making in the Ultimatum Game: Fairness vs. Reason.
Advances in Cognitive Neurodynamics (V). Singapur: Springer-Verlag, 2016 - (Wang, R.; Pan, X.), s. 185-191. Advances in Cognitive Neurodynamics, 1. ISBN 978-981-10-0205-2. ISSN 2213-3569.
[ICCN 2015. Sanya (CN), 03.06.2015-07.06.2015]
Grant CEP: GA ČR GA13-13502S
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985556
Klíčová slova: fairness * rationality * Ultimatum game * decision making
Kód oboru RIV: BB - Aplikovaná statistika, operační výzkum
http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2016/AS/guy-0453669.pdf

According to Game Theory a human subject playing the Ultimatum Game should choose more for oneself and offer the least amount possible for co-players (assumption of selfish rationality) [1]. However, economy, sociology and neurology communities repeatedly claim nonrationality of the human behaviour [2], following the observation that responders reject offers they find too low and proposers often offer more than the smallest amount, thus suggesting that humans’ behaviour is significantly influenced by social norms. We also assume human rationality, but our model describes a human-responder via decision process with a reward function respecting fairness as much as the economic profit. This model is positively tested against a set of original experimental data, thus providing an insight into human’s motivation as a social being.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0257058