Počet záznamů: 1

Does a 'non-committed' government always generate lower social welfare than its 'committed' counterpart? Strategic trade policy when consumer surplus matters

  1. 1.
    0368801 - NHU-N 2012 RIV US eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
    Žigić, Krešimir
    Does a 'non-committed' government always generate lower social welfare than its 'committed' counterpart? Strategic trade policy when consumer surplus matters.
    Journal of Comparative Economics. Roč. 39, č. 4 (2011), s. 533-556 ISSN 0147-5967
    Grant CEP: GA MŠk LC542
    Výzkumný záměr: CEZ:AV0Z70850503
    Klíčová slova: government commitment * social welfare * optimal tariffs and export subsidies
    Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
    Impakt faktor: 1.028, rok: 2011

    We show that social welfare in the setup where the government lacks the full ability to commit to its trade policies may exceed the social welfare when the government possesses full commitment power if consumer surplus is part of the social welfare function. This is never the case in the standard, "third market" framework of strategic trade policy. We provide two examples in which consumer surplus matters: the "home market" and the "intraindustry trade" setup. The policy instruments under consideration are import tariffs and export subsidies and there are R&D spillovers from the domestic to the foreign firm.
    Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0203043
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