Počet záznamů: 1

Oligopolistic price competition with informed and uninformed buyers

  1. 1.
    0351492 - NHU-C 2011 RIV CZ eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
    Ostatnický, Michal
    Oligopolistic price competition with informed and uninformed buyers.
    CERGE-EI Working Paper Series. -, č. 413 (2010), s. 1-34 ISSN 1211-3298
    Výzkumný záměr: CEZ:MSM0021620846
    Klíčová slova: oligopoly * price competition * price dispersion
    Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
    http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp413.pdf http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp413.pdf

    The standard price competition of two or more players leads to Bertrand equilibrium in basic economic theory. I follow the literature that originated with Varian’s (1980) model, especially Kocas and Kiyak (2006), and analyze oligopolistic markets where buyers have reservation values drawn from a common distribution function rather than a single value (inelastic demand), as typically assumed in the models of Varian’s or Kocas and Kiyak’s type. The model presented in this paper is developed from the simplest symmetric set-up (uninformed buyers are assigned to sellers evenly) to the most complex asymmetric set-up with many competing sellers (uninformed buyers are distributed over sellers unevenly).
    Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0191232