Počet záznamů: 1

Pexeso ("Concentration game") as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models

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    0347865 - UTIA-B 2011 RIV CZ eng C - Konferenční příspěvek (zahraniční konf.)
    Kuběna, Aleš Antonín
    Pexeso ("Concentration game") as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models.
    Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Mathematical Methods in Economics 2010. České Budějovice: University of South Bohemia, 2010 - (Houda, M.; Friebelová, J.), s. 337-380. ISBN 978-80-7394-218-2.
    [28-th International Conference on Mathematical Methods in Economics. České Budějovice (CZ), 08.09.2010-10.09.2010]
    Grant CEP: GA ČR GD402/09/H045
    Výzkumný záměr: CEZ:AV0Z10750506
    Klíčová slova: Concentration game * pexeso * perfect players
    Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
    http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2010/E/kubena-pexeso (concentration game) as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models.pdf http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2010/E/kubena-pexeso (concentration game) as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models.pdf

    Among board games, Pexeso (Concentration game) for two players is a game almost purely output-oriented, i.e. the optimal play is not given by strategic plans with long-term horizon (e.g. no short-term tactical sacrifice is observed). So, the optimal strategy and game dynamics may be calculated almost analytically, assuming a given rationality restrictions of the players. In the paper, the optimal strategy for two players is solved using dynamic programming. Further, it is proved that for rational players, the game would end with ”stalemate” (the game never ends) with a probability close to 1. Further, the game dynamics is described if a rationality restriction is given such that the players perform a random move instead of the optimal one with probabilities P,Q > 0. In this case, the probability of a stalemate is equal to zero.
    Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0188542