Počet záznamů: 1

On the hidden costs of monitoring corruption or effort

  1. 1.
    0341789 - NHU-C 2011 RIV CZ eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
    Krajčová, Jana
    On the hidden costs of monitoring corruption or effort.
    CERGE-EI Working Paper Series. -, č. 404 (2010), s. 1-37 ISSN 1211-3298
    Grant CEP: GA MŠk LC542
    Výzkumný záměr: CEZ:MSM0021620846
    Klíčová slova: corruption * monitoring * two-period principal-agent model
    Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
    http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp404.pdf http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp404.pdf

    In this paper, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent’s incentives in a two-period principal-agent model in which the agent decides on his effort and corruptibility. The agent’s type and strategy are unknown to the principal. I compare incentive-compatible wages under three different scenarios: when the principal does not monitor and only observes output; when she monitors the agent’s effort choice; and when she monitors the agent’s corruptibility.
    Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0184668
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