Počet záznamů: 1
The Impact of Critical Rationalism: Expanding the Popperian Legacy Through the Works of Ian C. Jarvie
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SYSNO ASEP 0504476 Druh ASEP M - Kapitola v monografii Zařazení RIV C - Kapitola v knize Název Popper and Hume: Two Great Sceptics Tvůrce(i) Parusniková, Zuzana (FLU-F) RID, ORCID, SAI Zdroj.dok. The Impact of Critical Rationalism: Expanding the Popperian Legacy Through the Works of Ian C. Jarvie. - Cham : Palgrave Macmillan, 2019 / Sassower R. ; Laor N. - ISBN 978-3-319-90825-0 Rozsah stran s. 207-225 Poč.str. 19 s. Poč.str.knihy 348 Forma vydání Tištěná - P Jazyk dok. eng - angličtina Země vyd. DE - Německo Klíč. slova David Hume ; Karl Popper ; induction ; knowledge ; scepticism ; falsification Vědní obor RIV AA - Filosofie a náboženství Obor OECD Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology Institucionální podpora FLU-F - RVO:67985955 EID SCOPUS 85064099033 DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-90826-7_17 Anotace Karl Popper explicitly discusses two problems in David Hume’s epistemology. He praises Hume for his critique of induction, specifically for his claim that inductive inferences are logically invalid. He rejects Hume’s psychological account of induction, specifically his theory of belief formation by repetition. Thus, Popper famously concludes that Hume buried the logical gems in the psychological mud and endorsed an irrationalist epistemology. The logical problem of induction gives Popper the impetus for spelling out his new, negative concept of reason, one which is incompatible with justification, however, Popper’s approach does not adequately deal with all the relevant themes related to Hume’s psychological problem of induction: our instinctive yearning for justification. Yet Popper and Hume have more in common than Popper explicitly acknowledges. Pracoviště Filosofický ústav Kontakt Chlumská Simona, chlumska@flu.cas.cz ; Tichá Zuzana, asep@flu.cas.cz Tel: 221 183 360 Rok sběru 2020
Počet záznamů: 1