Počet záznamů: 1
Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron–Ferejohn model
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SYSNO ASEP 0460088 Druh ASEP J - Článek v odborném periodiku Zařazení RIV J - Článek v odborném periodiku Poddruh J Článek ve WOS Název Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron–Ferejohn model Tvůrce(i) Celik, Levent (NHU-C) RID
Karabay, Bilgehan (NHU-C) RIDZdroj.dok. Theory and Decision - ISSN 0040-5833
Roč. 81, č. 1 (2016), s. 33-52Poč.str. 20 s. Jazyk dok. eng - angličtina Země vyd. US - Spojené státy americké Klíč. slova multilateral bargaining ; equilibrium uniqueness ; veto players Vědní obor RIV AH - Ekonomie CEP GAP402/12/0666 GA ČR - Grantová agentura ČR Institucionální podpora NHU-C - PRVOUK-P23 UT WOS 000376680100003 EID SCOPUS 84945544222 DOI 10.1007/s11238-015-9520-1 Anotace In political economy, the seminal contribution of the Baron–Ferejohn bargaining model constitutes an important milestone for the study of legislative policy making. In this paper, we analyze a particular equilibrium characteristic of this model, equilibrium uniqueness. The Baron–Ferejohn model yields a class of payoff-unique stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in which players’ equilibrium strategies are not uniquely determined. We first provide a formal proof of the multiplicity of equilibrium strategies. This also enables us to establish some important properties of SSPE. We then introduce veto players into the original Baron–Ferejohn model. We state the conditions under which the new model has a unique SSPE not only in terms of payoffs but also in terms of players’ equilibrium strategies. Pracoviště Národohospodářský ústav - CERGE Kontakt Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Rok sběru 2017
Počet záznamů: 1