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Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis
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SYSNO ASEP 0429243 Druh ASEP J - Článek v odborném periodiku Zařazení RIV J - Článek v odborném periodiku Poddruh J Článek ve WOS Název Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis Tvůrce(i) Blanco, M. (CO)
Engelmann, Dirk (NHU-N) RID
Koch, A. K. (DK)
Normann, H.-T. (DE)Zdroj.dok. Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier - ISSN 0899-8256
Roč. 87, September (2014), s. 122-135Poč.str. 14 s. Jazyk dok. eng - angličtina Země vyd. US - Spojené státy americké Klíč. slova beliefs ; consensus effect ; social dilemma Vědní obor RIV AH - Ekonomie Institucionální podpora NHU-N - RVO:67985998 UT WOS 000343391800008 EID SCOPUS 84901657989 DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005 Anotace In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction channels. When subjects play both roles in such experiments, a positive correlation between first- and second-mover behavior is frequently reported. We find that the observed correlation primarily originates via an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs through a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. However, we also find evidence for a direct, preference-based channel. When first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first moves. Pracoviště Národohospodářský ústav Kontakt Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Rok sběru 2015
Počet záznamů: 1