The Synthesis of of Empiricism and Innatism in Berkeley's Doctrine of Notions
1.
SYSNO ASEP
0351765
Druh ASEP
J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Zařazení RIV
J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Poddruh J
Ostatní články
Název
The Synthesis of of Empiricism and Innatism in Berkeley's Doctrine of Notions
Tvůrce(i)
Hill, James (FLU-F)
Zdroj.dok.
Berkeley Studies
- ISSN 1947-3737
Roč. 21, č. 21 (2010), s. 3-15
Poč.str.
12 s.
Forma vydání
www - www
Jazyk dok.
eng - angličtina
Země vyd.
US - Spojené státy americké
Klíč. slova
empiricism ; innatism ; notions
Vědní obor RIV
AA - Filosofie a náboženství
CEP
GAP401/10/1504 GA ČR - Grantová agentura ČR
CEZ
AV0Z90090514 - FLU-F (2005-2011)
Anotace
This essay argues that Berkeley's doctrine of notions is an account of concept-formation that offers a middle-way between empiricism and innatism, something which Berkeley himself asserts at Siris 308. First, the widespread assumption that Berkeley accepts Locke's conceptual empiricism is questioned, with particular attention given to Berkeley's views on innatism and ideas of reflection. Then, it is shown that Berkeley's doctrine of notions comes very close to the refined form of innatism to be found in Descartes’ later writings and in Leibniz. Finally, it is argued that Berkeley denies a principle common to both empiricism and innatism, namely, that all conceptual knowledge amounts to the perception of ideas. By denying this―at least in the case of the concepts of self, causation, substance, and virtue―Berkeley is able to provide a synthesis of conceptual empiricism and innatism.
