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Coordination cycles
- 1.
SYSNO ASEP 0343725 Druh ASEP J - Článek v odborném periodiku Zařazení RIV J - Článek v odborném periodiku Poddruh J Článek ve WOS Název Coordination cycles Tvůrce(i) Steiner, Jakub (NHU-N) RID Zdroj.dok. Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier - ISSN 0899-8256
Roč. 63, č. 1 (2008), s. 308-327Poč.str. 20 s. Jazyk dok. eng - angličtina Země vyd. US - Spojené státy americké Klíč. slova global games ; coordination ; crises ; cycles and fluctuations Vědní obor RIV AH - Ekonomie CEZ AV0Z70850503 - NHU-N (2005-2011) UT WOS 000256284000016 EID SCOPUS 41649114771 DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.005 Anotace Players repeatedly face a coordination problem in a dynamic global game. By choosing a risky action (invest) instead of waiting, players risk instantaneous losses as well as a loss of payoffs from future stages, in which they cannot participate if they go bankrupt. Thus, the total strategic risk associated with investment in a particular stage depends on the expected continuation payoff. High continuation payoff makes investment today more risky and therefore harder to coordinate on, which decreases today's payoff. Thus, expectation of successful coordination tomorrow undermines successful coordination today, which leads to fluctuations of equilibrium behavior even if the underlying economic fundamentals happen to be the same across the rounds. The dynamic game inherits the equilibrium uniqueness of the underlying static global game. Pracoviště Národohospodářský ústav Kontakt Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Rok sběru 2011
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