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Coordination cycles

  1. 1.
    SYSNO ASEP0343725
    Druh ASEPJ - Článek v odborném periodiku
    Zařazení RIVJ - Článek v odborném periodiku
    Poddruh JČlánek ve WOS
    NázevCoordination cycles
    Tvůrce(i) Steiner, Jakub (NHU-N) RID
    Zdroj.dok.Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier - ISSN 0899-8256
    Roč. 63, č. 1 (2008), s. 308-327
    Poč.str.20 s.
    Jazyk dok.eng - angličtina
    Země vyd.US - Spojené státy americké
    Klíč. slovaglobal games ; coordination ; crises ; cycles and fluctuations
    Vědní obor RIVAH - Ekonomie
    CEZAV0Z70850503 - NHU-N (2005-2011)
    UT WOS000256284000016
    EID SCOPUS41649114771
    DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.005
    AnotacePlayers repeatedly face a coordination problem in a dynamic global game. By choosing a risky action (invest) instead of waiting, players risk instantaneous losses as well as a loss of payoffs from future stages, in which they cannot participate if they go bankrupt. Thus, the total strategic risk associated with investment in a particular stage depends on the expected continuation payoff. High continuation payoff makes investment today more risky and therefore harder to coordinate on, which decreases today's payoff. Thus, expectation of successful coordination tomorrow undermines successful coordination today, which leads to fluctuations of equilibrium behavior even if the underlying economic fundamentals happen to be the same across the rounds. The dynamic game inherits the equilibrium uniqueness of the underlying static global game.
    PracovištěNárodohospodářský ústav
    KontaktTomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122
    Rok sběru2011
Počet záznamů: 1