Počet záznamů: 1
Does a 'non-committed' government always generate lower social welfare than its 'committed' counterpart? Strategic trade policy when consumer surplus matters
SYS 0368801 LBL 01789^^^^^2200277^^^450 005 20231122134817.3 014 $a 000299064700006 $2 WOS 017 70
$a 10.1016/j.jce.2011.03.006 $2 DOI 100 $a 20120313d m y slo 03 ba 101 0-
$a eng $d eng 102 $a US 200 1-
$a Does a 'non-committed' government always generate lower social welfare than its 'committed' counterpart? Strategic trade policy when consumer surplus matters 215 $a 24 s. 463 -1
$1 001 cav_un_epca*0251164 $1 011 $a 0147-5967 $e 1095-7227 $1 200 1 $a Journal of Comparative Economics $v Roč. 39, č. 4 (2011), s. 533-556 $1 210 $c Elsevier 610 0-
$a government commitment 610 0-
$a social welfare 610 0-
$a optimal tariffs and export subsidies 700 -1
$3 cav_un_auth*0106361 $a Žigić $b Krešimir $p NHU-N $w Economics Institute $4 070 $T Národohospodářský ústav AV ČR, v. v. i.
Počet záznamů: 1