Počet záznamů: 1
Searle on Emergence
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SYSNO ASEP 0383967 Druh ASEP J - Článek v odborném periodiku Zařazení RIV J - Článek v odborném periodiku Poddruh J Článek ve WOS Název Searle on Emergence Tvůrce(i) Havlík, Vladimír (FLU-F) RID, ORCID, SAI Zdroj.dok. Organon F. - : Veda - vydavatel'stvo SAV - ISSN 1335-0668
Roč. 19, Supp.2 (2012), s. 40-48Poč.str. 9 s. Jazyk dok. eng - angličtina Země vyd. SK - Slovensko Klíč. slova emergence ; mind ; consciousness ; emergent property ; system property Vědní obor RIV AA - Filosofie a náboženství Institucionální podpora FLU-F - RVO:67985955 UT WOS 000314437800005 EID SCOPUS 84873528470 Anotace Searle's conception of ontological emergence is a basis for his explanation of mind and consciousness in the physical world. In this article, I try to show that a closer examination uncovers some possible ambiguities in Searle’s conception of emergence. First, I try to show that Searle’s distinction between emergent1 and emergent2 leads to a distinction between a strong and a weak interpretation of a causal consequence of interactions among constitutive entities and that from this point of view the existence of emergent2 is improbable only in the strong sense. Second, I attempt to clarify Searle’s distinction between explanation and deduction of consciousness in his claim for the non-deducibility of consciousness. At the end I try to show in what sense is Searle’s concept of emergence loaded with a form of mechanicism, one which is being abandoned in more recent ontological conceptions. Pracoviště Filosofický ústav Kontakt Chlumská Simona, chlumska@flu.cas.cz ; Tichá Zuzana, asep@flu.cas.cz Tel: 221 183 360 Rok sběru 2013
Počet záznamů: 1