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A more general framework to analyze whether voluntary disclosure is insufficient or excessive
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SYSNO ASEP 0439518 Druh ASEP J - Článek v odborném periodiku Zařazení RIV J - Článek v odborném periodiku Poddruh J Článek ve WOS Název A more general framework to analyze whether voluntary disclosure is insufficient or excessive Tvůrce(i) Celik, Levent (NHU-C) RID Zdroj.dok. Review of Industrial Organization - ISSN 0889-938X
Roč. 44, č. 2 (2014), s. 161-178Poč.str. 18 s. Jazyk dok. eng - angličtina Země vyd. US - Spojené státy americké Klíč. slova monopoly ; quality uncertainty ; verifiable information disclosure Vědní obor RIV AH - Ekonomie Institucionální podpora NHU-C - PRVOUK-P23 UT WOS 000333206600005 EID SCOPUS 84897029249 DOI 10.1007/s11151-013-9409-5 Anotace I analyze if the excessive quality disclosure finding of the “classical literature” extends to environments in which consumers have a downward-sloping demand. While the answer is affirmative, there are at least two situations under which disclosure is socially insufficient: (1) when there are quality levels that are too low to generate any positive demand; and (2) when the prior beliefs place sufficiently higher weight on lower qualities. In both cases, non-disclosure by the seller leads to a severe reduction in the perceived quality, thereby significantly lowering the demand and the quantity consumed. Pracoviště Národohospodářský ústav - CERGE Kontakt Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Rok sběru 2015
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