Počet záznamů: 1
Opaque selling
- 1.0532768 - NHU-C 2021 RIV NL eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Anderson, S. P. - Celik, Levent
Opaque selling.
Information Economics and Policy. Roč. 52, September (2020), č. článku 100869. ISSN 0167-6245. E-ISSN 1873-5975
Grant CEP: GA ČR(CZ) GA15-22540S
Institucionální podpora: Progres-Q24
Klíčová slova: opaque products * product line design * product differentiation
Obor OECD: Economic Theory
Impakt faktor: 1.558, rok: 2020
Způsob publikování: Omezený přístup
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100869
We study “opaque” selling in multiproduct environments – a marketing practice in which sellers strategically withhold product information by keeping important characteristics of their products hidden until after purchase. We show that a monopolist will always use opaque selling, but it is not first-best optimal to do so. However, opaque selling might be used at the constrained optimum (with the monopolist’s pricing behavior taken as given). For linear disutility costs, it is optimal for a monopolist to offer a single opaque product.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0311161
Počet záznamů: 1