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Do higher wages produce career politicians? Evidence from two discontinuity designs
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SYSNO ASEP 0497264 Druh ASEP V - Výzkumná zpráva Zařazení RIV O - Ostatní Název Do higher wages produce career politicians? Evidence from two discontinuity designs Tvůrce(i) Palguta, J. (CZ)
Pertold, Filip (NHU-N) RIDVyd. údaje Prague: CERGE-EI, 2018 ISSN 1211-3298 Edice CERGE-EI Working Paper Series Č. sv. edice 630 Poč.str. 56 s. Forma vydání Tištěná - P Jazyk dok. eng - angličtina Země vyd. CZ - Česká republika Klíč. slova re-election ; political selection ; electoral competition Vědní obor RIV AH - Ekonomie Obor OECD Applied Economics, Econometrics Institucionální podpora NHU-N - RVO:67985998 Anotace Wages paid to politicians affect both the selection of candidates into electoral races and the on-the-job performance incentives of incumbents. We differentiate between selection and incentive effects using two regression discontinuity designs based on: 1) population thresholds shifting politicians' wages and 2) electoral seat thresholds splitting candidates into those who narrowly won or lost. We find that higher wages do not increase the electoral incumbency advantage, suggesting that the incentive effect of higher wages does not impact re-election rates. We further show that higher wages motivate narrowly elected incumbents to run again much less often than past narrowly non-elected candidates. Pracoviště Národohospodářský ústav Kontakt Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Rok sběru 2019 Elektronická adresa https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp630.pdf
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