Incompatibility and Inference as Bases of Logic

0506960 - FLÚ 2020 RIV GB eng C - Konferenční příspěvek (zahraniční konf.)
Peregrin, Jaroslav
Incompatibility and Inference as Bases of Logic.
The Logica Yearbook 2015. London: College Publications, 2016 - (Arazim, P.; Dančák, M.), s. 157-162. ISBN 978-1-84890-213-8.
[Logica 2015. Hejnice (CZ), 15.06.2015-19.06.2015]
Grant CEP: GA ČR(CZ) GA13-21076S
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: inference * incompatibility * classical logic * intuitionist logic
Obor OECD: Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

That logic can be based merely either on the concept of inference, or on that of incompatibility has been already shown. The question is whether such austere foundations predetermine the kind of logic we reach in such a way. In this paper we show that in the case of logic based on inference the natural outcome is intuitionist logic, while we can reach also classical logic (if we sacrifice naturalness). However, in case of logic based on incompatibility the outcome is not really optional: the resulting logic is classical and there is no obvious way how to reach intuitionist logic.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0298078