A dynamic model of censorship

0585305 - NHÚ 2025 RIV US eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Sun, Yiman
A dynamic model of censorship.
Theoretical Economics. Roč. 19, č. 1 (2024), s. 29-60. ISSN 1933-6837. E-ISSN 1555-7561
Grant ostatní: AV ČR(CZ) LQ300852101
Program: Prémie Lumina quaeruntur
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985998
Klíčová slova: censorship * information manipulation * learning
Obor OECD: Applied Economics, Econometrics
Impakt faktor: 1.7, rok: 2022
Způsob publikování: Open access
https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4639

We study the interaction between an agent of uncertain type, whose project gives rise to both good and bad news, and an evaluator who must decide if and when to fire the agent. The agent can hide bad news from the evaluator at some cost, and will do so if this secures her a significant increase in tenure. When bad news is conclusive, censorship hurts the evaluator, the good agent, and possibly the bad agent. However, when bad news is inconclusive, censorship may benefit all those players. This is because the good agent censors bad news more aggressively than the bad agent, which improves the quality of information.
Trvalý link: https://hdl.handle.net/11104/0353017