0580607 - FLÚ 2024 RIV GB eng M - Část monografie knihy
Bantegnie, Brice
On the alleged misrepresentation problem. (Not a problem for HOT theories. Not a problem for any theory, really.).
Conscious and Unconscious Mentality. Examining their Nature, Similarities, and Differences. London: Routledge, 2024 - (Hvorecký, J.; Marvan, T.; Polák, M.), s. 74-87. ISBN 978-1-032-52979-0
Grant CEP: GA ČR(CZ) GA20-14445S
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: Higher-Order Thought * consciousness * misrepresentation * perception * relational HOT theory
Obor OECD: Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003409526-6

Higher-order theories of consciousness account for state-consciousness in higher-order states. Arguably the most widely accepted such theory (or, more precisely, family of theories) is the Higher-Order Thought (hereafter ‘HOT’) theory. There are two ways of conceiving of a HOT theory. We can mean that there is a first-order state and that the HOT represents it as being a certain way. But, alternatively, we can mean that the HOT represents a state as being a certain way-where it is not implied that there is such a state. We can speak of relational and non-relational HOT theories, respectively. A relational HOT theory faces a series of problems, the most serious of which being, arguably, the problem of misrepresentation. My aim in this short chapter is to show that there is no such thing as the misrepresentation problem for relational HOT theories, and for any theory, really. First, strictly speaking there is no misrepresentation problem for relational HOT theories because cases of misrepresentation could only show that relationalists should change their explananda, in themselves, these cases have no bearing on their theories. Second, cases of misrepresentation actually do not show that-that is, they do not prevent relationalists from characterizing their explanandum the way they do.
Trvalý link: https://hdl.handle.net/11104/0349511