A scoring rule and global inaccuracy measure for contingent varying importance

0576108 - FLÚ 2024 RIV NL eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Janda, Pavel
A scoring rule and global inaccuracy measure for contingent varying importance.
Philosophical Studies. An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. Roč. 180, č. 12 (2023), s. 3323-3352. ISSN 0031-8116. E-ISSN 1573-0883
Grant ostatní: AV ČR(CZ) AP1602
Program: Akademická prémie - Praemium Academiae
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: contingent importance * weighted scoring rules * strict propriety * accuracy
Obor OECD: Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Způsob publikování: Open access
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02028-z

Levinstein recently presented a challenge to accuracy-first epistemology. He claims that there is no strictly proper, truth-directed, additive, and differentiable scoring rule that recognises the contingency of varying importance, i.e., the fact that an agent might value the inaccuracy of her credences differently at different possible worlds. In my response, I will argue that accuracy-first epistemology can capture the contingency of varying importance while maintaining its commitment to additivity, propriety, truth-directedness, and differentiability. I will construct a scoring rule — a weighted scoring rule — and a global inaccuracy measure that has all four required properties and recognises the contingency of varying importance. I will show that Levinstein’s and my results coexist without contradicting each other.
Trvalý link: https://hdl.handle.net/11104/0347949