Kamalaśīla’s commentary to the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā sūtra

0564545 - OÚ 2023 eng A3 - Přednáška/prezentace nepublikovaná
Holba, Jiří
Kamalaśīla’s commentary to the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā sūtra.
[Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies /19./. Seoul, 15.08.2022-19.08.2022]
Způsob prezentace: Přednáška
Pořadatel akce: Seoul National University
URL akce: https://iabsinfo.net/conferences/past-conferences/ 
Institucionální podpora: RVO:68378009
Klíčová slova: Kamalaśīla * Vajracchedikāṭīkā * Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra * Diamond Sūtra * Kamalaśīla’s commentary
Obor OECD: Religious studies

Kamalaśīla’s (c. 740–795 CE) Vajracchedikāṭīkā (Tib. Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa rdo rje gcod pa ’grel pa) is an erudite, albeit relatively short, commentary on the highly influential Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra or Diamond Sūtra (c. 300–500 CE). Although the ṭīkā follows the structure of Vasubandhu’s Saptapadārthaṭīkā (Tib. Don bdun gyi rgya ccher ’grel pa, Ch. Qizhong yiju, Seven topics of meanings), Kamalaśīla interprets the Vajracchedikā with a novel epistemological approach, which sheds important light on key issues in the interpretation of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras. This paper has two parts. In the first one, I discuss Kamalaśīla’s commentary to the difficult passage in § 7 of the Vajracchedikā “This dharma which has been taught by the Tathāgata, is ungraspable, it is inexpresable, it is neither dharma or not-dharma. Why? Because the Noble people are distinguished by the unconditional” (yo ’sau tathāgatena dharmo deśitaḥ / (agrāhyaḥ s)o ’nabhilapya / na sa dharmo nādharmaḥ / tat kasya hetoḥ / asaṃskṛtaprabhāvitā hy āryapudgalāḥ // ed. Harrison). In the second part, I examine Kamalaśīla’s approach to the often repeat ed, contradictory statements in the Vajracchedikā. Such locutions, which P. Harrison has called the work’s “signature formulae,” say: “X does not exist therefore we say that X does exist.” For example, “‘Buddha’s fields’, Subhūti, these the Tathāgata has taught to not be (Buddha’s) fields. Thus they are said to be Buddha’s fields” (kṣetravyūhāḥ kṣetravyūhā iti subhūte ’vyūhās te tathāgatena bhāṣitāḥ / tenocyante kṣetravyūhā iti //). In his commentary (Derge 231b5–7), Kamalaśīla interprets one such signature formula from the Mādhyamika differentiated perspective of two truths (satya): Buddha’s fields being “neither one nor many” (ekānekaviyoga), i.e. empty (śūnya), do not ultimately (paramārthasat) exist. However, seeing them from the point of view of conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya), they do exist. Drawing on insightful comments by Tillemans, I argue that Kamalaśīla’s interpretations can solve some contradictions in Buddhist texts and undermine a strong dialetheistic or paraconsistent reading of them (e.g., Garfield, Priest).
Trvalý link: https://hdl.handle.net/11104/0336220