Hume on the Self and Personal Identity

0562836 - FLÚ 2023 RIV CH eng M - Část monografie knihy
Janoušek, Hynek
Husserl (and Brentano) on Hume’s Notion of the Self.
Hume on the Self and Personal Identity. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2022 - (O’Brien, D.), s. 251-274. ISBN 978-3-031-04274-4
Grant CEP: GA ČR(CZ) GA20-02972S
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: David Hune * Edmund Husserl * Franz Brentano * the self * identity * empiricism * phenomenology
Obor OECD: Ethics (except ethics related to specific subfields)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04275-1_11

Hynek Janoušek turns to the phenomenological tradition and Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Husserl’s phenomenology does not include either a unitary experienced self or a Kantian transcendental self, and he describes the self as a bundle. Husserl’s discussions of Hume form part of a wider appreciation of Hume in the German speaking world at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. There are, however, important differences between the constituents of our bundles for Hume and Husserl. For Husserl, the conscious contents of experience have intentionality, that is, they are experienced as directed at pumpkins and pencils, trees and patches of red, whereas for Hume, such impressions and ideas are described according to their intrinsic character. In the second edition of Logical Investigations, Husserl abandons Hume entirely, as he there comes to accept the existence of a pure unitary ego.
Trvalý link: https://hdl.handle.net/11104/0335154