Psychology and Neuroscience. The Distinctness Question

0559407 - FLÚ 2023 RIV NL eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Bantegnie, Brice
Psychology and Neuroscience. The Distinctness Question.
Erkenntnis. Roč. 87, č. 4 (2022), s. 1753-1772. ISSN 0165-0106
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: mechanistic explanations * functional explanation * autonomy of psychology
Obor OECD: Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Impakt faktor: 0.9, rok: 2022
Způsob publikování: Omezený přístup
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00272-x

In a recent paper, Gualtiero Piccinini and Carl Craver have argued that psychology is not distinct from neuroscience. Many have argued that Piccinini and Craver’s argument is unsuccessful. However, none of these authors have questioned the appropriateness of Piccinini and Craver’s argument for their key premise-that functional analyses are mechanism sketches. My first and main goal in this paper is to show that Piccinini and Craver offer normative considerations (on what functional analyses should be) in support of what is a descriptive premise and to provide some guidelines on how to argue for this premise. My second goal is to show that the distinctness question should be of great significance for philosophy of cognitive science.
Trvalý link: https://hdl.handle.net/11104/0333624