Self-selection into public service when corruption is widespread: the anomalous Russian case

0553083 - NHU-C 2022 RIV US eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Gans-Morse, J. - Kalgin, A. - Klimenko, A. - Vorobyev, Dmitriy - Yakovlev, A.
Self-selection into public service when corruption is widespread: the anomalous Russian case.
Comparative Political Studies. Roč. 54, č. 6 (2021), s. 1086-1128. ISSN 0010-4140. E-ISSN 1552-3829
Institucionální podpora: Progres-Q24
Klíčová slova: corruption and patronage * political economy * public administration
Obor OECD: Public administration
Impakt faktor: 3.955, rok: 2021
Způsob publikování: Omezený přístup
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020957669

Drawing on experimental games and surveys conducted with students at two universities in Russia, we compare the behavioral, attitudinal, and demographic traits of students seeking public sector employment to the traits of their peers seeking jobs in the private sector. Contrary to similar studies conducted in other high-corruption contexts, such as India, we find evidence that students who prefer a public sector career display less willingness to cheat or bribe in experimental games as well as higher levels of altruism. However, disaggregating public sector career paths reveals distinctions between the federal civil service and other types of public sector employment, with federal government positions attracting students who exhibit some similarities with their peers aspiring to private sector careers. We discuss multiple interpretations consistent with our findings, each of which has implications for the creation of effective anti-corruption policies and for understanding of state capacity in contexts where corruption is widespread.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0328100