The Idealism-Realism Debate Among Edmund Husserl’s Early Followers and Critics

0545804 - FLÚ 2022 RIV CH eng M - Část monografie knihy
Hopkins, Burt
The “Offence of any and all Ready-Made Givenness”: Natorp’s Critique of Husserl’s Ideas I.
The Idealism-Realism Debate Among Edmund Husserl’s Early Followers and Critics. Cham: Springer, 2021 - (Parker, R.), s. 73-97. Contributions To Phenomenology, 112. ISBN 978-3-030-62158-2; ISBN 978-3-030-62159-9
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: Absolute givenness * Heidegger * Husserl * Natorp * Non-reflective * Pre-reflective * Reflection * Sartre * Zahavi
Obor OECD: Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62159-9_4

I present the first systematic account in the literature of a Husserlian response to Natorp’s critique of Husserl’s account (in Ideas I) of the pre-givenness of both the absolute stream of lived-experience and its essences to reflection. My response is presented within the broader context of what I argue is Heidegger’s misappropriation of Natorp’s critique of the phenomenological limits of reflection in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and the misguided French attempt to address Heidegger’s critique by introducing the dialectical notion of “pre-reflective” consciousness to phenomenology. My Husserlian response (1) shows that Husserl’s account of reflection in Ideas I is able to rebut Natorp’s critical claims that transcendental phenomenology cannot access the streaming of the stream of lived-experience without “stilling” its flow and (2) that a gap in Husserl’s account of the transformation of the natural phenomenon of reflection into transcendental reflection provides justification for Natorp’s criticism of the ambiguity of Husserl’s account in Ideas I of the givenness of the essence of lived-experience investigated by transcendental phenomenology.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0323898