Wolterstorff on Reid’s Notion of Common Sense

0544204 - FLÚ 2022 RIV CZ eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Glombíček, Petr
Wolterstorff on Reid’s Notion of Common Sense.
Studia Neoaristotelica. Roč. 17, č. 2 (2020), s. 221-238. ISSN 1214-8407. E-ISSN 1804-6843
Grant CEP: GA ČR(CZ) GA17-06904S
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: common sense * principles * sense perception * Nicholas Wolterstorff * Thomas Reid * Aristotle
Obor OECD: Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Způsob publikování: Omezený přístup
https://doi.org/10.5840/studneoar20201727

The paper addresses a mainstream contemporary view of the notion of common sense in Thomas Reid’s philosophy, as proposed by Nicholas Wolterstorff who claims that Reid was not clear about the concept of common sense, or about the principles of common sense. In contrast, this paper presents Reid’s conception as a clear and traditional Aristotelian notion of common sense and its principles as presuppositions of particular sense judgments, usually taken for granted. The alleged confusion about principles is resolved by a distinction between principles of common sense and first principles as such.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0321251