Frege, Peano and the Construction of a Logical Calculus

0542961 - FLÚ 2022 RIV BE eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Bertran-San Millán, Joan
Frege, Peano and the Construction of a Logical Calculus.
Logique et Analyse. -, č. 253 (2021), s. 3-22. ISSN 0024-5836
Grant ostatní: AV ČR(CZ) AP1602
Program: Akademická prémie - Praemium Academiae
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: Frege * Peano * inference * deduction * logical calculus
Obor OECD: Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Způsob publikování: Omezený přístup
http://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.253.0.3289334

In contemporary historical studies Peano is usually linked to the logical tradition pioneered by Frege. In this paper I question this association. Specifically, I claim that Frege and Peano developed significantly different conceptions of a logical calculus. First, I claim that while Frege put the systematisation of the notion of inference at the forefront of his construction of an axiomatic logical system, Peano modelled his early logical systems as mathematical calculi and did not really attempt to justify reasoning. Second, I argue that in later works on logic Peano advanced towards a deductive approach that was closer to Frege’s standpoint.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0320343