Is predictive processing a theory of perceptual consciousness?

0542332 - FLÚ 2022 RIV GB eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Marvan, Tomáš - Havlík, M.
Is predictive processing a theory of perceptual consciousness?
New Ideas in Psychology. -, č. 61 (2021), č. článku 100837. ISSN 0732-118X. E-ISSN 1873-3522
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: Predictive processing * Consciousness * Prerequisites of consciousness * Prediction error minimization * Perceptual hypothesis
Obor OECD: Cognitive sciences
Impakt faktor: 2.927, rok: 2021
Způsob publikování: Open access
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2020.100837

Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offered by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0319766