0524920 - FLÚ 2021 RIV CH eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Arazim, Pavel
Beyond Logical Pluralism and Logical Monism.
Logica Universalis. Roč. 14, č. 2 (2020), s. 151-174. ISSN 1661-8297. E-ISSN 1661-8300
Grant CEP: GA ČR(CZ) GA17-15645S
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: Logical concepts * Development * Logical pluralism * Inferentialism * Expressivism * Logical dynamism
Obor OECD: Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Impakt faktor: 0.385, rok: 2020 ; AIS: 0.255, rok: 2020
Způsob publikování: Omezený přístup
Web výsledku:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-020-00253-2DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-020-00253-2

Logical pluralism as a thesis that more than one logic is correct seems very plausible for two basic reasons. First, there are so many logical systems on the market today. And it is unclear how we should decide which of them gets the logical rules right. On the other hand, logical monism as the opposite thesis still seems plausible, as well, because of normativity of logic. An approach which would manage to bring a synthesis of both logical pluralism and logical monism is called for. I review the possible forms of logical pluralism and render them more plausible. I thus arrive at logical dynamism, a synthesis of various pluralisms and monism focused on how logic develops.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0309151