Unpacking Normativity. Conceptual, Normative, and Descriptive Issues

0503716 - ÚSP 2019 RIV GB eng M - Část monografie knihy
Pavlakos, George
Non-naturalism, Normativity and the Meaning of Ought: Some Lessons from Kelsen.
Unpacking Normativity. Conceptual, Normative, and Descriptive Issues. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018, s. 77-94. ISBN 978-1-50991-624-5
Grant CEP: GA ČR GA15-23955S
Institucionální podpora: RVO:68378122
Klíčová slova: non-naturalism * normativity * Kelsen * law * morality
Obor OECD: Law

In Non-Naturalism, Normativity and the Meaning of Ought: Some Lessons from Kelsen, George Pavlakos argues that Kelsen is committed to certain non-naturalist presuppositions that are incompatible with what pavlakos characterises as a strict separation between the legal and the moral domain. As he understands it, non-naturalism is synonymous with, or at least constitutes a condition of, practical normativity in general. Pavlakos argues that insofar as normativity pertains to the moral as well as the legal domain, one cannot consistently treat legal obligation in a non-naturalistic manner and concludes by attempting to sketch an alternative account of normativity that does not, as he believes Kelsens does, entail an artificial distinction between law and morality that condemn(s) law to interness.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0295513