Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity

0491716 - FLÚ 2019 RIV CH eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Polák, M. - Marvan, Tomáš
Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity.
Frontiers in Psychology. Roč. 9, 24 July (2018), s. 1-13, č. článku 1269. E-ISSN 1664-1078
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) * type identity theory * phenomenal states * type-token * noncausal account of NCC
Obor OECD: Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Impakt faktor: 2.129, rok: 2018
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269/full

One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept, more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0285348