Epistemic logics for sceptical agents

0471689 - FLÚ 2017 RIV GB eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Bílková, M. - Majer, Ondrej - Peliš, Michal
Epistemic logics for sceptical agents.
Journal of Logic and Computation. Roč. 26, č. 6 (2016), s. 1815-1841. ISSN 0955-792X. E-ISSN 1465-363X
Grant CEP: GA ČR(CZ) GA13-21076S
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: epistemic logic * substructural logic * frame semantics
Kód oboru RIV: AA - Filosofie a náboženství
Impakt faktor: 0.909, rok: 2016

In this article, we introduce an epistemic modal operator modelling knowledge over distributive non-associative full Lambek calculus with a negation. Our approach is based on the relational semantics for substructural logics: we interpret the elements of a relational frame as information states consisting of collections of data. The principal epistemic relation between the states is the one of being a reliable source of information, on the basis of which we explicate the notion of knowledge as information confirmed by a reliable source. From this point of view it is natural to define the epistemic operator formally as the backward-looking diamond modality. The framework is a generalization and extension of the system of relevant epistemic logic proposed by Majer and Pelis (2009, college Publications, 123-135) and developed by Bilkova et al. (2010, college Publications, 22-38). The system is modular in the sense that the axiomatization of the epistemic operator is sound and complete with respect to a wide class of background logics, which makes the system potentially applicable to a wide class of epistemic contexts. Our system admits a weak form of logical omniscience (the monotonicity rule), but avoids stronger ones (a necessitation rule and a K-axiom) as well as some closure properties discussed in normal epistemic logics (like positive and negative introspection). For these properties we provide characteristic frame conditions, so that they can be present in the system if they are considered to be appropriate for some specific epistemic context. We also prove decidability of the weakest epistemic logic we consider, using a filtration method. Finally, we outline further extensions of our framework to a multiagent system.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0269113