Information unraveling revisited: disclosure of horizontal attributes

0439519 - NHU-C 2015 RIV GB eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Celik, Levent
Information unraveling revisited: disclosure of horizontal attributes.
Journal of Industrial Economics. Roč. 62, č. 1 (2014), s. 113-136. ISSN 0022-1821. E-ISSN 1467-6451
Grant ostatní: UK(CZ) UNCE 204005/2012
Institucionální podpora: PRVOUK-P23
Klíčová slova: product quality * competition
Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
Impakt faktor: 1.039, rok: 2014

This paper analyzes in a spatial framework how much information a seller discloses about the variety he sells when he faces a buyer with a privately known taste for variety. I identify an equilibrium in which, for each possible variety, the seller’s optimal strategy consists of either fully disclosing the variety or disclosing how far it is from the buyer’s expected taste. The set of varieties the seller fully discloses monotonically expands as the buyer’s taste for variety becomes stronger. I show that this is the unique undefeated equilibrium. From a policy perspective, mandating full disclosure is socially harmful.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0244318