Influential opinion leaders

0439146 - NHU-C 2015 RIV GB eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Loeper, A. - Steiner, Jakub - Stewart, C.
Influential opinion leaders.
Economic Journal. Roč. 124, č. 581 (2014), s. 1147-1167. ISSN 0013-0133. E-ISSN 1468-0297
Grant CEP: GA ČR(CZ) GA13-34759S
Grant ostatní: UK(CZ) UNCE 204005/2012
Institucionální podpora: PRVOUK-P23
Klíčová slova: two-stage coordination game * equilibrium outcome * expert influence
Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
Impakt faktor: 2.336, rok: 2014

We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium outcome is biased towards the experts’ interests even though followers know the distribution of expert interests. Expert influence is fully decentralised in the sense that each individual expert has a negligible impact. The bias in favour of experts results from a social learning effect that is multiplied through a coordination motive. We apply our results to the onset of social movements and to the diffusion of products with network externalities.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0242450