Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions

0395840 - NHÚ 2015 RIV US eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Břeský, Michal
Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions.
Games and Economic Behavior. Roč. 82, November (2013), s. 205-217. ISSN 0899-8256. E-ISSN 1090-2473
Grant CEP: GA ČR(CZ) GAP402/11/1531
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985998
Klíčová slova: multi-unit auction * multiple-object auction * market efficiency
Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
Impakt faktor: 1.025, rok: 2013

This paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform-price multi-unit auction with a positive reservation price. I demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency (or welfare) in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. I show that the higher the reservation price is,the higher is the seller’s revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The reservation price increases the bidder’s equilibrium strategy in a specific way that is inherent to the uniform-price auction. Thus the reservation price effect on efficiency is in contrast to other auction formats; e.g., the reservation price decreases efficiency in the Vickrey auction and single-unit auctions with symmetric bidders. Therefore the main result can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single-unit/single-dimensional context to the multi-unit/multi-dimensional one.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0223740