The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy

0394193 - FLÚ 2014 RIV GB eng M - Část monografie knihy
Peregrin, Jaroslav
Inferentialism and Normativity.
The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013 - (Beaney, M.), s. 1082-1097. ISBN 978-0-19-923884-2
Grant CEP: GA ČR(CZ) GAP401/10/0146
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: inferentialism * normativity * meaning
Kód oboru RIV: AA - Filosofie a náboženství

Inferentialism can be characterized as the conviction that to be meaningful, in the distinctively human way, or to possess 'conceptual content', is to be governed by a certain kind of inferential rules. The rationale for articulating inferentialism as a fully-fledged philosophical position is to emphasize its distinctness from the more traditional representationalism. Inferentialism is closely connected with the conviction that any kind of human meaning is essentially, in Sellars's often quoted words, "fraught with ought". It follows that when describing phenomena that have to do with meaning (language, mind etc.) we cannot make do with the language of natural science. This is not because some additional concepts are lacking, but because claims concerning meaning are often not indicative claims.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0222501