Simple market equilibria with rationally inattentive consumers

0377204 - NHÚ 2013 RIV US eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Matějka, Filip - McKay, A.
Simple market equilibria with rationally inattentive consumers.
American Economic Review. Roč. 102, č. 3 (2012), s. 24-29. ISSN 0002-8282. E-ISSN 1944-7981
Grant CEP: GA ČR(CZ) GPP402/11/P236
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985998
Klíčová slova: rational choice theory * bounded rationality * consumer research
Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
Impakt faktor: 2.792, rok: 2012

We study a market with rationally inattentive consumers who are unsure of the terms of the offers made by firms, but can acquire information about the terms at a cost. In a symmetric equilibrium, the price set by firms is continuously increasing in the cost of information for consumers and decreasing in the number of firms operating. In addition, favorable a priori information about a firm leads it to set a higher price, and a new entrant can increase demand for incumbents. When consumers have heterogeneous costs of information, firms selling low-quality products may choose to set the highest prices.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0209430