Počet záznamů: 1  

Jesuit Probabilistic Logic between Scholastic and Academic Philosophy

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    SYSNO ASEP0508404
    Druh ASEPJ - Článek v odborném periodiku
    Zařazení RIVJ - Článek v odborném periodiku
    Poddruh JČlánek ve WOS
    NázevJesuit Probabilistic Logic between Scholastic and Academic Philosophy
    Tvůrce(i) Hanke, Miroslav (FLU-F) RID, ORCID, SAI
    Zdroj.dok.History and Philosophy of Logic. - : Taylor & Francis - ISSN 0144-5340
    Roč. 40, č. 4 (2019), s. 355-373
    Poč.str.19 s.
    Forma vydáníTištěná - P
    Jazyk dok.eng - angličtina
    Země vyd.GB - Velká Británie
    Klíč. slovaprobabilistic logic ; logical validity ; epistemic logic ; Jesuits ; second scholasticism
    Vědní obor RIVAA - Filosofie a náboženství
    Obor OECDPhilosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
    CEPGA17-12408S GA ČR - Grantová agentura ČR
    Způsob publikováníOmezený přístup
    Institucionální podporaFLU-F - RVO:67985955
    UT WOS000472974300001
    EID SCOPUS85066985999
    DOI10.1080/01445340.2019.1615363
    AnotaceThere is a well-documented paradigm-shift in eighteenth century Jesuit philosophy and science, at the very least in Central Europe: traditional scholastic version(s) of Aristotelianism were replaced by early modern rationalism (Wolff’s systematisation of Leibnizian philosophy) and early modern science and mathematics. In the field of probability, this meant that the traditional Jesuit engagement with probability, uncertainty, and truthlikeness (in particular, as applied to moral theology) could translate into mathematical language, and can be analysed against the background of the accounts of probability, pre-mathematical Jesuit logic, Wolff’s conceptual analysis, and Bernoullian mathematisation. The works of two Jesuit philosophers, Berthold Hauser and Sigismund Storchenau, can be related to this context. The core of their logic of (epistemic) probability is the account of negation (or ‘contradiction’) and implication (or ‘argument’), in particular, the algorithms for computing the reliability of one piece of evidence when compared to the respective counter-evidence and for computing the probability of a conclusion given the probability of its premises.
    PracovištěFilosofický ústav
    KontaktChlumská Simona, chlumska@flu.cas.cz ; Tichá Zuzana, asep@flu.cas.cz Tel: 221 183 360
    Rok sběru2020
    Elektronická adresahttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01445340.2019.1615363
Počet záznamů: 1  

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