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Frege’s adoption of the distinction between concept and object
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SYSNO ASEP 0502057 Druh ASEP C - Konferenční příspěvek (mezinárodní konf.) Zařazení RIV D - Článek ve sborníku Název Frege’s adoption of the distinction between concept and object Tvůrce(i) Bertran-San Millán, Joan (FLU-F) Zdroj.dok. Actas del IX Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. - Madrid : UNED, 2018 / Saborido C. ; Oms S. ; de Prado J. G. - ISBN 978-84-09-06054-2 Rozsah stran s. 16-18 Poč.str. 3 s. Forma vydání Online - E Akce Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España /9./ Datum konání 13.10.2018 - 16.10.2018 Místo konání Madrid Země ES - Španělsko Typ akce WRD Jazyk dok. eng - angličtina Země vyd. ES - Španělsko Klíč. slova Frege ; Begriffsschrift ; Grundlagen ; function ; concept ; concept-script Vědní obor RIV AA - Filosofie a náboženství Obor OECD Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology Institucionální podpora FLU-F - RVO:67985955 Anotace I discuss Frege’s philosophical transit from Begriffsschrift to Grundlagen. I focus on the replacement of function-argument scheme with the concept-object scheme, which has received virtually no attention in historical studies. Begriffsschrift’s reception and Frege’s response to criticisms are taken in [Heck, May, 2013] as the main reason for Frege’s adoption of the concept-object scheme. I claim that there are two additional causes of Frege’s move. First, in the context of the deployment of the logicist project, Frege noticed the limitations of Begriffsschrift’s formal system and the need to establish an ontological foundation – based on the concept-object scheme – that allowed him to provide a definition of natural number. Second, the function-argument scheme provided an inadequate analysis of atomic statements. I defend that the concept-object scheme should not be seen as an extension of the function-argument scheme. What is essential to the notion of concept is its unsaturatedness, which is never attributed to Begriffsschrift’s notion of function. From this stance I argue that two features show the virtues of the concept-object scheme: first, Frege’s notion of concept sets a foundation for the principle of the priority of judgements over concepts, second, the concept-object scheme allows an adequate semantical analysis of categorical statements. Pracoviště Filosofický ústav Kontakt Chlumská Simona, chlumska@flu.cas.cz ; Tichá Zuzana, asep@flu.cas.cz Tel: 221 183 360 Rok sběru 2019 Elektronická adresa https://cristiansaborido.weebly.com/news/actas-del-ix-congreso-de-la-sociedad-de-logica-metodologia-y-filosofia-de-la-ciencia-en-espana-proceedings-of-the-ix-conference-of-the-spanish-society-of-logic-methodology-and-philosophy-of-science
Počet záznamů: 1