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Dynamic elections and ideological polarization
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SYSNO ASEP 0481444 Document Type J - Journal Article R&D Document Type Journal Article Subsidiary J Článek ve WOS Title Dynamic elections and ideological polarization Author(s) Nunnari, S. (IT)
Zápal, Jan (NHU-N) ORCIDSource Title Political Analysis. - : Cambridge University Press - ISSN 1047-1987
Roč. 25, č. 4 (2017), s. 505-534Number of pages 30 s. Language eng - English Country US - United States Keywords elections ; political polarization Subject RIV AH - Economics OECD category Economic Theory Institutional support NHU-N - RVO:67985998 UT WOS 000423295500006 DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2017.24 Annotation How does political polarization affect the welfare of the electorate? We analyze this question using a framework in which two policy and office motivated parties compete in an infinite sequence of elections. We propose two novel measures to describe the degree of conflict among agents: antagonism is the disagreement between parties, extremism is the disagreement between each party and the representative voter. These two measures do not coincide when parties care about multiple issues. We show that forward-looking parties have an incentive to implement policies favored by the representative voter, in an attempt to constrain future challengers. This incentive grows as antagonism increases. On the other hand, extremism decreases the electorate’s welfare. We discuss the methodological and empirical implications for the existing measures of political actors’ ideal points and for the debate on elite polarization. Workplace Economics Institute Contact Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Year of Publishing 2018
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