Počet záznamů: 1

Second best efficiency and the English auction

  1. 1.
    0364945 - NHU-N 2012 RIV US eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
    Hernando-Veciana, Á. - Michelucci, Fabio
    Second best efficiency and the English auction.
    Games and Economic Behavior. Roč. 73, č. 2 (2011), s. 496-506 ISSN 0899-8256
    Výzkumný záměr: CEZ:AV0Z70850503
    Klíčová slova: auctions * efficiency * mechanism design
    Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
    Impakt faktor: 0.829, rok: 2011

    We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the biddersʼ incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskinʼs (1992) result that any first best allocation that is deterministic and monotone can be implemented with the English auction carries over to the second best.
    Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0200303
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