Second best efficiency and the English auction

0364945 - NHÚ 2012 RIV US eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Hernando-Veciana, Á. - Michelucci, Fabio
Second best efficiency and the English auction.
Games and Economic Behavior. Roč. 73, č. 2 (2011), s. 496-506. ISSN 0899-8256. E-ISSN 1090-2473
Výzkumný záměr: CEZ:AV0Z70850503
Klíčová slova: auctions * efficiency * mechanism design
Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
Impakt faktor: 0.829, rok: 2011

We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the biddersʼ incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskinʼs (1992) result that any first best allocation that is deterministic and monotone can be implemented with the English auction carries over to the second best.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0200303