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- 1.0441232 - NHU-C 2015 RIV NL eng J - Journal Article
Hernando-Veciana, Á. - Michelucci, Fabio
On the optimality of not allocating.
Economics Letters. Roč. 125, č. 2 (2014), s. 233-235. ISSN 0165-1765. E-ISSN 1873-7374
Grant - others:UK(CZ) UNCE 204005/2012
Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23
Keywords : auctions * mechanism design
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
Impact factor: 0.510, year: 2014
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0244264 - 2.0433362 - NHÚ 2015 RIV NL eng J - Journal Article
Hernando-Veciana, Á. - Michelucci, Fabio
On the optimality of not allocating.
Economics Letters. Roč. 125, č. 2 (2014), s. 233-235. ISSN 0165-1765. E-ISSN 1873-7374
Institutional support: RVO:67985998
Keywords : auctions * mechanism design
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
Impact factor: 0.510, year: 2014
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0237616 - 3.0430985 - NHU-C 2015 CZ eng V - Research Report
Hernando-Veciana, Á. - Michelucci, Fabio
On the optimality of not allocating.
Prague: CERGE-EI, 2014. 9 s. CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, 514. ISSN 1211-3298
Grant - others:UK(CZ) UNCE 204005/2012
Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23
Keywords : efficiency * auctions * mechanism design
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp514.pdf
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0241499File Download Size Commentary Version Access Wp514.pdf 0 295.7 KB Publisher’s postprint open-access - 4.0430984 - NHÚ 2015 CZ eng V - Research Report
Hernando-Veciana, Á. - Michelucci, Fabio
On the optimality of not allocating.
Prague: CERGE-EI, 2014. 9 s. CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, 514. ISSN 1211-3298
Institutional support: RVO:67985998
Keywords : efficiency * auctions * mechanism design
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp514.pdf
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0235645File Download Size Commentary Version Access Wp514.pdf 0 295.7 KB Publisher’s postprint open-access - 5.0397516 - NHU-C 2014 CZ eng V - Research Report
Hernando-Veciana, Á. - Michelucci, Fabio
Do not panic: how to avoid inefficient rushes using multi-stage auctions.
Prague: CERGE-EI, 2013. 33 s. CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, 489. ISSN 1211-3298
Grant - others:UK(CZ) UNCE 204005/2012
Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23
Keywords : efficiency * auctions * mechanism design
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp489.pdf
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0225125 - 6.0397390 - NHÚ 2014 CZ eng V - Research Report
Hernando-Veciana, Á. - Michelucci, Fabio
Do not panic: how to avoid inefficient rushes using multi-stage auctions.
Prague: CERGE-EI, 2013. 33 s. CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, 489. ISSN 1211-3298
Institutional support: RVO:67985998
Keywords : efficiency * auctions * mechanism design
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp489.pdf
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0225122File Download Size Commentary Version Access Wp489.pdf 0 472.3 KB Publisher’s postprint open-access - 7.0364945 - NHÚ 2012 RIV US eng J - Journal Article
Hernando-Veciana, Á. - Michelucci, Fabio
Second best efficiency and the English auction.
Games and Economic Behavior. Roč. 73, č. 2 (2011), s. 496-506. ISSN 0899-8256. E-ISSN 1090-2473
Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z70850503
Keywords : auctions * efficiency * mechanism design
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
Impact factor: 0.829, year: 2011
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0200303File Download Size Commentary Version Access 0364945_IR.pdf 1 644.6 KB Author’s postprint require