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Does a 'non-committed' government always generate lower social welfare than its 'committed' counterpart? Strategic trade policy when consumer surplus matters

SYSNO	0368801
Title	Does a 'non-committed' government always generate lower social welfare than its 'committed' counterpart? Strategic trade policy when consumer surplus matters
Author(s)	Žigić, Krešimir (NHU-N)_RID
Source Title	Journal of Comparative Economics. Roč. 39, č. 4 (2011), s. 533-556. - : Elsevier
Document Type	Článek v odborném periodiku
Grant	LC542 GA MŠMT - Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS)
CEZ	AV0Z70850503 - NHU-N (2005-2011)
Language	eng
Country	US
Keywords	government commitment * social welfare * optimal tariffs and export subsidies
Permanent Link	http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0203043

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Number of the records: 1