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Monopoly provision of tune-ins

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    SYSNO ASEP0312862
    Document TypeJ - Journal Article
    R&D Document TypeJournal Article
    Subsidiary JOstatní články
    TitleMonopoly provision of tune-ins
    TitleMonopolní vysílání upoutávek
    Author(s) Celik, Levent (NHU-C) RID
    Source TitleCERGE-EI Working Paper Series - ISSN 1211-3298
    -, č. 362 (2008), s. 1-31
    Number of pages31 s.
    Publication formwww - www
    Languageeng - English
    CountryCZ - Czech Republic
    Keywordsinformative advertising ; tune-ins ; television station
    Subject RIVAH - Economics
    CEZMSM0021620846 - NHU-C
    AnnotationThis paper analyzes a single television station's choice of airing tune-ins (preview advertisements). I consider two consecutive programs located along a unit line. Potential viewers know the earlier program but are uncertain about the later one. The TV station may air a fully informative tune-in during the first program. The cost of the tune-in is the forgone advertising revenue. Under mild conditions, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which some viewers watch the first program just to see if there is a tune-in or not, and the TV station airs a tune-in unless the two programs are too dissimilar. In the absence of a tune-in, no viewer within the first-period audience keeps watching TV. Full information disclosure never arises. The market outcome is suboptimal; a social planner would air a tune-in for a wider range of programs.
    WorkplaceEconomics Institute - CERGE
    ContactTomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122
    Year of Publishing2009
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