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Bidding behavior when one bidder and the auctioneer are vertically integrated: implications for the partial deregulation of EU electricity markets
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SYSNO ASEP 0044269 Document Type J - Journal Article R&D Document Type Journal Article Subsidiary J Ostatní články Title Bidding behavior when one bidder and the auctioneer are vertically integrated: implications for the partial deregulation of EU electricity markets Title Licitační chování v situaci, kdy jeden nabízející a jeden dražitel jsou vertikálně integrovaní: dopady na částečnou deregulaci trhu s elektřinou v EU Author(s) van Koten, Silvester (NHU-N) RID Source Title CERGE-EI Working Paper Series - ISSN 1211-3298
-, č. 313 (2006), s. 1-35Number of pages 35 s. Publication form WWW - WWW Language eng - English Country CZ - Czech Republic Keywords asymmetric auctions ; bidding behavior ; electricity markets Subject RIV AH - Economics R&D Projects LC542 GA MŠMT - Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) CEZ AV0Z70850503 - NHU-N (2005-2011) Annotation When a bidder (referred to as the privileged bidder) is residual claimant to a part of the revenue from an auction with two bidders whose valuations are independently and identically distributed, bidding incentives are changed. Specifically, the privileged bidder will bid more aggressively to increase the auction revenue. Indeed, the privileged bidder is more likely to win the auction and the good is sold for a higher price. However, since the auction is now inefficient, welfare is decreased. These results are of interest for regulators of the EU electricity industry. Workplace Economics Institute Contact Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Year of Publishing 2007
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