Choice of corporate risk management tools under moral hazard
1.
SYSNO ASEP
0039384
Document Type
J - Journal Article
R&D Document Type
Journal Article
Subsidiary J
Ostatní články
Title
Choice of corporate risk management tools under moral hazard
Title
Výběr nástrojů pro řízení operačního rizika za subjektivního rizika
Author(s)
Bena, Jan (NHU-N)
Source Title
CERGE-EI Working Paper Series
- ISSN 1211-3298
-, č. 298 (2006), s. 1-43
Number of pages
43 s.
Publication form
WWW - WWW
Language
eng - English
Country
CZ - Czech Republic
Keywords
risk management ; corporate insurance ; moral hazard
Subject RIV
AH - Economics
R&D Projects
LC542 GA MŠMT - Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS)
CEZ
AV0Z70850503 - NHU-N (2005-2011)
Annotation
This paper examines the choice of tools for managing a firm’s operational risks: cash reserves, insurance contracts, and financial assets under an optimal financing contract that solves moral hazard between insiders and outside investors. Risk management is valuable as it reduces the costs of raising external financing, increases debt capacity, lessens underinvestment, and improves welfare. I show that insurance is superior as it facilitates the outside financing relationship but leads to inefficient excessive continuation if used without coverage limits. When insurance against an operational risk is not available, the firm uses financial assets instead or resorts to holding cash reserves.
Workplace
Economics Institute
Contact
Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122
Year of Publishing
2007
Number of the records: 1
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