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Vásquez’s Anselmian Response to Wycliffian Deterministic Arguments

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    SYSNO ASEP0504699
    Document TypeJ - Journal Article
    R&D Document TypeJournal Article
    Subsidiary JČlánek ve WOS
    TitleVásquez’s Anselmian Response to Wycliffian Deterministic Arguments
    Author(s) Dvořák, Petr (FLU-F) ORCID
    Source TitleAmerican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. - : Philosophy Documentation Center - ISSN 1051-3558
    Roč. 93, č. 2 (2019), s. 251-270
    Number of pages20 s.
    Publication formPrint - P
    Languageeng - English
    CountryUS - United States
    Keywordsdeterminism ; free will ; divine foreknowledge ; scholasticism
    Subject RIVAA - Philosophy ; Religion
    OECD categoryPhilosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
    R&D ProjectsGB14-37038G GA ČR - Czech Science Foundation (CSF)
    Method of publishingLimited access
    Institutional supportFLU-F - RVO:67985955
    UT WOS000462027400005
    EID SCOPUS85065960621
    DOI10.5840/acpq2019311175
    AnnotationGabriel Vasquez (1549-1604) discusses two deterministic arguments ascribed to John Wyclif. He appeals to the Anselmian solution based on the distinction between two types of necessity: antecedent and subsequent necessity. Unlike the former, the latter necessity does not destroy future event’s contingency, which is required if it is to result from a free choice. The paper discusses the Aristotelian objection according to which a statement describing some contingent future event is either without truth-value, and thus antecedently contingent but not (broadly) subsequently necessary at present, or it has a truth-value, but then it is not merely (broadly) subsequently necessary but also antecedently necessary. The Anselmian temporal ontology is such that no absolute present parameter is to be included in the evaluation of modal tensed statements. This recognition disposes of modal notions tied to the absolute temporal qualification of statements and thus undercuts the objection.
    WorkplaceInstitute of Philosophy
    ContactChlumská Simona, chlumska@flu.cas.cz ; Tichá Zuzana, asep@flu.cas.cz Tel: 221 183 360
    Year of Publishing2020
    Electronic addresshttps://www.pdcnet.org/acpq/content/acpq_2019_0093_0002_0251_0270
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