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The Impact of Critical Rationalism: Expanding the Popperian Legacy Through the Works of Ian C. Jarvie

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    SYSNO ASEP0504476
    Document TypeM - Monograph Chapter
    R&D Document TypeMonograph Chapter
    TitlePopper and Hume: Two Great Sceptics
    Author(s) Parusniková, Zuzana (FLU-F) RID, ORCID, SAI
    Source TitleThe Impact of Critical Rationalism: Expanding the Popperian Legacy Through the Works of Ian C. Jarvie. - Cham : Palgrave Macmillan, 2019 / Sassower R. ; Laor N. - ISBN 978-3-319-90825-0
    Pagess. 207-225
    Number of pages19 s.
    Number of pages348
    Publication formPrint - P
    Languageeng - English
    CountryDE - Germany
    KeywordsDavid Hume ; Karl Popper ; induction ; knowledge ; scepticism ; falsification
    Subject RIVAA - Philosophy ; Religion
    OECD categoryPhilosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
    Institutional supportFLU-F - RVO:67985955
    EID SCOPUS85064099033
    DOI10.1007/978-3-319-90826-7_17
    AnnotationKarl Popper explicitly discusses two problems in David Hume’s epistemology. He praises Hume for his critique of induction, specifically for his claim that inductive inferences are logically invalid. He rejects Hume’s psychological account of induction, specifically his theory of belief formation by repetition. Thus, Popper famously concludes that Hume buried the logical gems in the psychological mud and endorsed an irrationalist epistemology. The logical problem of induction gives Popper the impetus for spelling out his new, negative concept of reason, one which is incompatible with justification, however, Popper’s approach does not adequately deal with all the relevant themes related to Hume’s psychological problem of induction: our instinctive yearning for justification. Yet Popper and Hume have more in common than Popper explicitly acknowledges.
    WorkplaceInstitute of Philosophy
    ContactChlumská Simona, chlumska@flu.cas.cz ; Tichá Zuzana, asep@flu.cas.cz Tel: 221 183 360
    Year of Publishing2020
Number of the records: 1  

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